Abstract. This paper proposes a novel scheme of group key management based on Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Map, named Jacobian Group Key Management(JGKM). The scheme is more efficient than other group key managements since fewer re-keying messages are sent when group membership changes. Besides, it provides both forward and backward secrecy. Therefore, this proposal is helpful to deploy secure multicast over some networks with high latency or limited bandwidth such as wireless network. Furthermore, it fits both small-scale and large-scale groups.
Introduction
Encryption is one of the most effective access control mechanisms. All data are encrypted by keys and thus key materials should keep away from attacks. In the context of unicast, a pairwise secure channel is employed to update keys. Contrarily, secure multicast must deal with more complications. Many group key management schemes for secure multicast have been proposed in the past decade [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . These schemes can be classified into three main classes, viz. centralized, decentralized and distributed. Centralized group key management schemes require a single or a small set of entities, named Key Server (KS), to generate or distribute share key to all group members via a secure channel. This kind of schemes can reduce both storage requirement and computational power remarkably. Respectively, decentralized key managements divide the whole group into smaller subgroups. Each subgroup is controlled by a single or several KSs. Distributed schemes allow each member to perform group key generation Supported by NSF 60473090 and the key generation can either be collaborative or done by a single member. However, no single one can uniquely determine what the key is. Each of the three schemes has its own advantages and disadvantages. No single scheme can fit all applications. For example, Centralized schemes have the risk of single-point-failure while distributed schemes must be weighed against its disadvantages: Many such schemes have a high complexity or a high computational cost. They are best suited for small-scale groups that have nodes with enough computational resources for group Diffie-Hellman key exchange and enough memory to store state information about all of the group's members. There also has to be a trusted mechanism to authenticate the membership join/leave events and the DH public keys.
Most of secure multicast key management schemes focus on decreasing computational and communication overhead [6] [7] [8] . In this paper, we introduce a novel approach based on Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Map (JECRM) to minimize re-keying messages and computational cost.
JECRM has attracted many researchers from a variety of fields recently, of course cryptographist included [10] [11] [12] [13] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] . Some encryption algorithms based on JECRM have been proven not secure [10] [11] [12] [13] . In despite of utilizing the same property in this paper, attacks provided in [10] take no effect.
Here is the layout of our paper. Section 2 introduces Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Map and its property. Section 3 illustrates Jacobian group key management detailedly. Security and complexity analysis are made in section 4 and 5. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 6.
Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Map
Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Map satisfies chatic properties such as pseudo-random, sensitivity to tiny change of initial conditions, ergodicity, one-way iteration process and etc. All of these properties are interconnected with cryptography closely.
Definition 1: Let v be a variable taking value over the interval [-1,1], let n ≥ 2 be an integer, Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Map with modulus w is recursively defined by:
where
JECRM has two important features [24, 25] :
Theorem 2. Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Map satisfies the semi-group property when r, s ≥ 2:
There are also other functions that satisfy semi-group property, for example, mod-exp function
The rest of the paper illustrates how to use JECRM to manage group keys in a secure group communication. The reason why we choose JECRM other than mod-exp function is explained in section 4.
Jacobian Group Key Managemen
The following notations will be used throughout this paper. The old group key before membership changes k new The new group key after membership changes {M } k M is encrypted by k Here we make a reasonable assumption: k pub is known to all group members. This can be done using PKI. k i is a pre-placed key between KS and group members. This can be done using pairwise key k pub and k pri .
A group key management must provide re-keying mechanisms when membership changes. JGKM supports the following operations:
-Join: a new member is added to the group.
-Leave: a member is evicted from the group.
-Merge: a subgroup is added to the group.
-Partition: a subgroup is split from the group -Re-key: the group key must be updated when any above operations occur.
Addition and Merge
Algorithm 1: At the beginning, there is no user in group. The first user is added by following steps.
Step 1. The first user u 1 sends joining request to KS.
Step 2. KS responses u 1 with {R r 1 (v, w)} k 1 , it can only be decrypted by u 1 .
Step 3. u 1 selects R r 1 (v, w) as the initial group session key. Obviously, key distribution starting up needs for only two messages.
With the group growing, more and more users need to be added. JGKM consists of four steps.
Algorithm 2:
Step 1. the newcomer u n+1 sends joining request to KS.
Step 2. KS responds u n+1 with {R r n+1 (v, w)} k n+1 . The cipher-text can only be decrypted by u n+1 .
Step 3. KS multicasts {r 1 , r 2 · · · r n+1 , w, cmd = addition} k pri to all members. Each member can decrypt r i (i = 1, 2 · · · n + 1) and w using k pub . cmd = addition indicates that each member should do addition computing after receiving this message. Here we should note that r i and w are public. Everyone knows k pub can decrypt r i and w. Signature is used here to prove the source of multicast. This can prevent malicious attackers from sending mendacious r i , w and cmd.
Step 4. Newcomer computes the new group key individually according to theorem 1:
Old ones do addition computing, the same new group key is produced by
Apparently, just three re-keying messages (from step 1 to step 3) are needed in JGKM when member added. Newcomers and old ones can compute new group key without too much interactions. This approach can be extended easily.
If m users, denoted as u n+1 , u n+2 , · · · ,u n+m , will be added: Algorithm 3:
Step 1. u n+1 , u n+2 , · · · u n+m send joining requests to KS.
Step 2. KS multicasts
Each member choose the right part to decrypt.
Step 3. KS multicasts {r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r n+m , w, cmd = addition} k pri
Step 4. Newcomer u n+i computes new group key by
Old members compute the same group key by
Here just 2m + 1 messages are needed. Now, we can draw a conclusion of JGKM.
Conclusion 1: The number of re-keying messages is irrelevant to current group size. It rests with the number of newcomers.
Eviction and Partition
It is easy to cope with member's eviction in JGKM. If member u d should be evicted, KS multicasts one message:
Algorithm 4:
Step 1. KS multicasts {u d , r d , cmd = eviction} k pri to all members. cmd = eviction indicates that each member should do eviction computing after receiving this message.
Step 2. The rest do eviction computing according below equation:
The new group key contains no information of u d . Simply, u d has been removed since he knows nothing about v while v is a secret selected by KS. Security discussion will be shown in section 4. It is also easy to extend this approach to fit m users' leaving. Assuming u j 1 , u j 2 · · · u jm leave the group.
Algorithm 5:
Step 1. KS multicasts a combined message {(u j 1 , r j 1 ), (u j 2 , r j 2 ), · · · , (u jm , r jm ), cmd = eviction} k pri to entire group.
Step 2. The rest do eviction computing and new group key is given by:
Similarly, the new group key contains no information of u j 1 , u j 2 , · · · , u jm Now, we have another conclusion: Conclusion 2: Only one re-keying message is sent when someone evicted.
Security Analysis
The security of group key management protocols can be measured by: -Backward secrecy: new members should not be able to read past traffic.
-Forward secrecy: Former members should not be able to read present and future traffic.
-Collusion attack: Evicted members must not be able to work together and share their individual piece of information to regain access to the group key.
From section 3, we know that JGKM's security bases on the secrecy of parameter v. JGKM provides both forward and backward secrecy grounding on the fact that R n (v, w) is one-way function in v and sensitive to initial condition v.
Considering an adversary u d a group insider, he knows r i (i = 1, 2...n) and R d (v, w). He does not know v and R r i (v, w), r i = d. The new group key has changed into k new after its leaving.
Discussion 1: Section 3.2 indicates that
This equation does not contain any information of u d at all. If u d want to regain the new group key, he must know r i , v, w. But v is a secrecy selected by KS.
Discussion 2: At the same time, section 3.2 implies
Obviously, k old is also a one-way function in k new , resolving k new from above equation is a hard problem as well. Not any efficient method or quantitative measurement [21, 22] have been found to finish this attack.
Similarly, If u d is a newcomer, it is also impossible to recover k old by
However, we must point out that r i should be restricted. Otherwise an adversary may recover group key without effort. Restriction 2: r i must be larger enough, e.g. r i ≥ 2 32 According to definition 1, if r i is very small, e.g. r i = 2 or 3, it is possible to resolve v from R r i (v, w). In order to enhance the security of JGKM, we choose random number r i ≥ 2 32 .
Restriction 3:
If r n = r 1 r 2 · · · r n−1 , according to algorithm 2, u n will receive KS's response R rn
which is the new group key after u n 's leaving.
Furthermore, restriction 3 also eliminates collusion attack. Now, we will explain why JECRM is chosen other than mod-exp function. Although mod-exp function does satisfy semi-group property, it is a one-way function in n rather than v. That is , it is easy to resolve v from mod-exp function. Therefore, v can't be chosen as common secrecy. If mod-exp function is chosen, it is obvious that an attacker can recover k old after his addition or regain k new after his eviction.
Complexity Analysis
JGKM involves multiple floating-point operations. We employ unique decomposition theorem to improve JGKM's efficiency. According to unique decomposition theorem, an integer r can be uniquely decomposed to r = p l1 1 p l2 2 · · · p ln n where p i are primes. If r is not decomposed, we must do r iterations in order to computer R r (v, w). On the other hand, according to following equation, at most p 1 l 1 + p 2 l 2 + · · · p n l n floating-point operations are needed. 
Summary
In this paper, we proposed a group key management based on Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Map. On one hand, it has the structure of centralized schemes, on the other hand, it has the virtue of distributed schemes. Briefly, it has following features:
-A Key Server is involved in performing initialization.
-Each group member contributes its share r i to group key.
-Each member receives a secrecy from KS.
-Each member make use of others' share and his own secrecy to compute new group key without interaction.
-As the group grows, old members' secrecy remain unchanged. New members' secrecy are sent by pre-placed secret channel.
-As the group shrinks, departing members' secrecy are removed from the new key.
-JGKM does not need any auxiliary keys except for pre-placed keys.
-JGKM is more efficient than other schemes [5-7, 14, 15] . The number of re-keying messages is irrelevant to current group size. Only 2m + 1 rekeying messages are sent when group grows and only 1 re-keying messages are sent when group shrinks. This makes it differ from other schemes. Most of group key managements involve 2m + log(n) re-keying messages where n is current group size.
